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We introduce a definition of the fidelity function for multi-round quantum strate-
gies, which we call the strategy fidelity, that is a generalization of the fidelity function
for quantum states. We provide many properties of the strategy fidelity including a
Fuchs-van de Graaf relationship with the strategy norm. We also provide a general
monotonicity result for both the strategy fidelity and strategy norm under the ac-
tions of strategy-to-strategy linear maps. We illustrate an operational interpretation
of the strategy fidelity in the spirit of Uhlmann’s Theorem and discuss its application
to the security analysis of quantum protocols for interactive cryptographic tasks such
as bit-commitment and oblivious string transfer. Our analysis is general in the sense
that the actions of the protocol need not be fully specified, which is in stark con-
trast to most other security proofs. Lastly, we provide a semidefinite programming
formulation of the strategy fidelity.
1 Introduction
1.1 Review of quantum strategies
In this paper we consider multiple-round interactions between two parties involving the exchange
of quantum information. There is a natural asymmetry between the parties as only one of the
parties can send the first message or receive the final message. Since we are not concerned
about optimizing the number of messages exchanged, without loss of generality both of these
tasks are done by the same party, which, for convenience, we call Bob. Let us call the other
party Alice. The interaction between Alice and Bob decomposes naturally into a finite number
r of rounds (see Figure 1).
Such interactions are conveniently described by the formalism of quantum strategies intro-
duced in Ref. [GW07]. We closely follow that formalism here with the exception that we
consider two mathematically different objects: strategies and pure strategies. Pure strate-
gies are implemented using linear isometries and preserve their final memory space, while
strategies trace out the final memory space. The object we call a strategy is called a non-
measuring strategy in Ref. [GW07]. For additional details on quantum strategies, one may refer
to [GW07, CDP09, Gut09].
Definition 1 (Pure strategy and pure co-strategy). Let r ≥ 1 and let X1, . . . ,Xr,Y1, . . . ,Yr,Zr,
Wr be complex Euclidean spaces and, for notational convenience, let Xr+1 := C and Z0 := C.
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An r-round pure strategy A˜ having input spaces X1, . . . ,Xr, output spaces Y1, . . . ,Yr, and final
memory space Zr, consists of:
1. complex Euclidean spaces Z1, . . . ,Zr−1, called intermediate memory spaces, and
2. an r-tuple of linear isometries (A1, . . . , Ar) of the form Ai : Xi ⊗Zi−1 → Yi ⊗Zi.
An r-round pure co-strategy having input spaces Y1, . . . ,Yr, output spaces X1, . . . ,Xr, and
final memory space Wr, consists of:
1. complex Euclidean intermediate memory spaces W0, . . . ,Wr−1,
2. a pure quantum state |β〉 ∈ X1 ⊗W0, called the initial state, and
3. an r-tuple of linear isometries (B1, . . . , Br) of the form Bi : Yi ⊗Wi−1 → Xi+1 ⊗Wi.
A pure strategy and a pure co-strategy are said to be compatible when the input spaces of one
are the output spaces of the other, and vice versa. The final state after the interaction between
A˜ and B˜ is denoted by
|ψ(A˜, B˜)〉 := (IZr ⊗Br)(Ar ⊗ IWr−1) · · · (IZ1 ⊗B1)(A1 ⊗ IW0)|β〉 ∈ Zr ⊗Wr.
In order to extract classical information from the interaction it suffices to permit Alice and
Bob to measure their respective parts of the final state |ψ(A˜, B˜)〉.
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Figure 1: An r-round interaction between a pure strategy of Alice (the linear isometries above the dashed
line) and a pure co-strategy of Bob (the linear isometries below the dashed line). Arrows crossing the dashed
line represent messages exchanged between the parties, while horizontal arrows represent private memory.
A pure strategy A˜ specified by linear isometries (A1, . . . , Ar) can be represented by a single
isometry
A˜ := (Ar ⊗ IY1...r−1) . . . (IX3...r ⊗A2 ⊗ IY1)(IX2...r ⊗A1) : X1...r → Y1...r ⊗Zr, (1)
where Xi...j is short for Xi⊗· · ·⊗Xj and Yi...j is short for Yi⊗· · ·⊗Yj . We abuse the notation1
A˜ here and elsewhere in the paper by using it to denote both a pure strategy and the linear
isometry representing it, and we do the same for pure co-strategies B˜, discussed next. A pure co-
strategy B˜ specified by the initial state |β〉 and linear isometries (B1, . . . , Br) can be represented
by a single isometry
B˜ := (Br ⊗ IX1...r) · · · (IY2...r ⊗B1 ⊗ IX1)(IY1...r ⊗ |β〉) : Y1...r → X1...r ⊗Wr. (2)
Note that two pure strategies that are represented by the same linear isometry are effectively
indistinguishable, and the same holds true for pure co-strategies.
1It will be clear from context to which we are referring.
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After the interaction, Alice’s actions do not affect Bob’s reduced state (and vice versa).
Hence, from Bob’s point of view, Alice can trace out her final memory space. In view of this, a
strategy A is obtained from a pure strategy A˜ by tracing out the final memory space Zr and a
co-strategy B is obtained from a pure co-strategy B˜ by tracing out the final memory spaceWr.2
Multiple pure strategies (pure co-strategies) can yield the same strategy (co-strategy), and we
call any such pure strategy (pure co-strategy) a purification. We will use tildes to indicate
purifications.
Just as a pure strategy and a pure co-strategy can be specified by linear isometries A˜ and
B˜, respectively, their corresponding strategy A and co-strategy B can be specified by quantum
channels
ΦA : L(X1...r)→ L(Y1...r) : X 7→ TrZr(A˜XA˜∗), (3)
ΨB : L(Y1...r)→ L(X1...r) : Y 7→ TrWr(B˜Y B˜∗), (4)
where L(X ) is the set of all linear operators acting on a space X . In turn, both of these channels
can be specified using their Choi-Jamio lkowski representations, but, due to the asymmetry
between strategies and co-strategies, it is convenient to specify the latter one using the Choi-
Jamio lkowski representation of its adjoint map. Thus, we can represent a strategy A by J(ΦA)
and a co-strategy B by J(Ψ∗B), both of which are positive semidefinite operators acting on
Y1...r ⊗ X1...r. In a similar abuse of notation as mentioned before, we refer to J(ΦA) as the
strategy A and to J(Ψ∗B) as the co-strategy B.
For compatible pure strategy A˜ and pure co-strategy B˜, let
ρA(B˜) := TrZr
(
|ψ(A˜, B˜)〉〈ψ(A˜, B˜)|
)
(5)
denote the reduced state of the final memory space Wr of B˜ after the interaction between A˜
and B˜. Since this state is the same for all purifications of A, we omit the tilde above A in this
notation.
1.2 The definition of strategy fidelity
Recall that the fidelity F(P,Q) between two positive semidefinite operators P and Q is defined
as
F(P,Q) :=
∥∥∥√P√Q∥∥∥
Tr
. (6)
When applied to density operators ρ, ξ, the fidelity function F(ρ, ξ) is a useful distance measure
for quantum states. We would like to construct a generalization of the fidelity function that
can serve as a useful distance measure for quantum strategies.
Just as the trace norm ‖ρ − ξ‖Tr quantifies the distinguishability of quantum states, the
strategy norm3 ‖S − T ‖r studied in [CDP08b] and [Gut12], quantifies the distinguishability
of quantum strategies S and T having the same input and output spaces. In other words,
‖S − T ‖r is proportional to the maximum bias with which an interacting pure co-strategy B˜
can distinguish S from T . Another expression for this maximum bias can be derived as follows.
Let Wr be the final memory space of B˜ and let ρS(B˜), ρT (B˜) be the reduced states of this final
memory space after an interaction between B˜ and S, T , respectively, as defined in (5). It is
clear that the maximum bias with which S can be distinguished from T is proportional to the
maximum over all such B˜ with which the final state ρS(B˜) can be distinguished from ρT (B˜),
which is precisely ‖ρS(B˜)− ρT (B˜)‖Tr.
2We note that, technically, strategies and pure strategies are (slightly) different mathematical objects.
3What we refer to as the strategy norm was introduced in [CDP08b] where it is called the operational norm.
We use the term strategy norm to make the connections to strategy fidelity more apparent.
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Remark 2. All purifications B˜ of B are equivalent up to a unitary acting on Wr. Thus,
unitarily invariant distance measures between ρS(B˜) and ρT (B˜) (including the trace distance
and the fidelity) depend only upon B and not upon the specific purification B˜.
The strategy norm is defined (see Definition 8) so that
‖S − T ‖r = max
B
‖ρS(B˜)− ρT (B˜)‖Tr. (7)
In light of this observation, we define the strategy fidelity by replacing the maximization of the
trace distance between ρS(B˜) and ρT (B˜) with the minimization of the fidelity between ρS(B˜)
and ρT (B˜).
Definition 3 (Strategy fidelity). For any r-round strategies S and T having the same input
and output spaces, the strategy fidelity is defined as
Fr(S, T ) := min
B
F(ρS(B˜), ρT (B˜)) (8)
where the minimization is over all compatible co-strategies B and the states ρS(B˜), ρT (B˜) are
as defined in (5).
In the following discussion, we argue that this definition is a meaningful one by proving
analogues of the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities and Uhlmann’s Theorem for the strategy
fidelity, among many other properties.
Remark 4. The same definition of fidelity has been considered for the case of channels [BDR05].
In that setting, they establish several properties which we generalize to the strategy setting.
First, let us observe that the fidelity for quantum states is recovered as a special case of
the strategy fidelity when S, T are one-round strategies with no input (that is, X1 = C) and
only one output message. To see this, observe that one-round strategies such as S, T are simply
states ρ, ξ acting on Y1. Bob’s most general pure co-strategy is an isometry B˜ : Y1 → W1. In
this case the effect of Bob’s purified strategy B˜ is cancelled in the computation of Fr(S, T ) so
that
F1(S, T ) = min
B
F(ρS(B˜), ρT (B˜)) = F(B˜ρB˜∗, B˜ξB˜∗) = F(ρ, ξ) (9)
as claimed.
Basic properties of the strategy fidelity
We now list several other properties of the strategy fidelity, all of which immediately hold
using the corresponding properties of the fidelity of quantum states (see references [FvdG99,
NC00]).
Proposition 5 (Basic properties).
• (Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities for strategies) For any r-round strategies S and T , it
holds that
1− 12‖S − T ‖r ≤ Fr(S, T ) ≤
√
1− 14‖S − T ‖
2r. (10)
• (Symmetry) For any r-round strategies S and T , it holds that Fr(S, T ) = Fr(T, S).
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• (Joint concavity) For any r-round strategies S1, . . . , Sn and T 1, . . . , Tn, and nonnegative
scalars λ1, . . . , λn satisfying
∑n
i=1 λi = 1, we have
Fr
(
n∑
i=1
λiS
i,
n∑
i=1
λiT
i
)
≥
n∑
i=1
λi Fr
(
Si, T i
)
. (11)
• (Bounds on the strategy fidelity) For any r-round strategies S and T , we have 0 ≤ Fr(S, T ) ≤ 1.
Moreover, Fr(S, T ) = 1 if and only if S = T and Fr(S, T ) = 0 if and only if S and T are
perfectly distinguishable.
We later discuss that the strategy version of the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities is crucial
to our cryptographic applications. This was also used implicitly in [CDP+13].
Monotonicity of the strategy fidelity and the strategy norm
The fidelity for quantum states is known to be monotonic under channels, meaning that
F(Φ(ρ),Φ(ξ)) ≥ F(ρ, ξ) (12)
for any choice of states ρ, ξ and channel Φ [BCF+96]. It was observed in Ref. [BDR05] that
the fidelity function of quantum channels (that aligns with our definition of strategy fidelity for
a 1-round interaction) is also monotonic under composition (both left and right) with another
channel. That is,
F1(Φ ◦∆,Ψ ◦∆) ≥ F1(Φ,Ψ) and F1(∆′ ◦ Φ,∆′ ◦Ψ) ≥ F1(Φ,Ψ) (13)
for all channels Φ,Ψ : L(X ) → L(Y) and ∆ into L(X ) and ∆′ on L(Y). However, there are
other physical maps on channels that cannot in general be written as a composition with another
channel. Chiribella, D’Ariano, and Perinotti call such mappings supermaps and characterize
them in Ref. [CDP08a]. Thus, the natural generalization of monotonicity of the kind described
above would be the analogous statement involving supermaps. We provide an even stronger
result concerning monotonicity of the strategy fidelity using the following definition.
Definition 6. A strategy supermap is a completely positive linear map (with respect to Choi-
Jamio lkowski representations) that maps r-round strategies to r′-round strategies. It is under-
stood that r-round strategies are for some choice of input spaces X1, . . . ,Xr and output spaces
Y1, . . . ,Yr and r′-round strategies are for some choice of input spaces X ′1, . . . ,X ′r′ and output
spaces Y ′1, . . . ,Y ′r′.
The definition of strategy supermaps are inspired by physically realizable maps from r-
round strategies to r′-round strategies studied by Chiribella, D’Ariano, and Perinotti [CDP09].
Our result, however, is purely mathematical and does not require strategy supermaps to be
physically realizable.
Theorem 7 (Monotonicity of the strategy fidelity). For all natural numbers r, r′, all r-round
strategies S, T , and all strategy supermaps Υ from r-round strategies to r′-round strategies, it
holds that
Fr′(Υ(S),Υ(T )) ≥ Fr(S, T ). (14)
We can also prove a similar monotonicity result for the strategy norm. By analogy with the
fidelity, the trace norm is known to be monotonic under channels, meaning that
‖Φ(X)‖Tr ≤ ‖X‖Tr (15)
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for all operators X and all channels Φ [Rus94]. Similarly, the diamond norm can be shown to
be monotonic under composition (both left and right) with channels, meaning that
‖Φ ◦∆‖ ≤ ‖Φ‖ and ‖∆′ ◦ Φ‖ ≤ ‖Φ‖ (16)
for all linear maps Φ : L(X ) → L(Y) and all channels ∆ into L(X ) and ∆′ on L(Y). As
with the fidelity function for quantum channels, defined in Ref. [BDR05], monotonicity of the
diamond norm under arbitrary supermaps has not yet been observed, nor has monotonicity of
the strategy norm under strategy supermaps.
We now establish a monotonicity result for the strategy norm, defined below.
Definition 8 (Strategy norm [CDP08b], [Gut12]). Consider X1, . . . ,Xr and Y1, . . . ,Yr as input
and output spaces of r-round strategies, respectively. The strategy norm of a Hermitian operator
H acting on Y1...r ⊗X1...r is defined as
‖H‖r := maxB0,B10 {〈B0 −B1, H〉 : B0 +B1 is an r-round co-strategy} , (17)
where the maximization is over all positive semidefinite operators B0, B1 acting on Y1...r⊗X1...r
such that B0 + B1 is an r-round co-strategy having input spaces Y1, . . . ,Yr and output spaces
X1, . . . ,Xr.
Given H as a difference of two r-round strategies S and T , Definition 8 implies Eqn. (7).
Theorem 9 (Monotonicity of the strategy norm). For all natural numbers r, r′, all Hermitian
operators H acting on Y1...r⊗X1...r and strategy supermaps Υ from r-round strategies to r′-round
strategies, it holds that
‖Υ(H)‖r′ ≤ ‖H‖r . (18)
Operational interpretation (min-max properties)
Here we propose an operationally motivated generalization of Uhlmann’s Theorem [Uhl76]
to the strategy fidelity. In so doing we elucidate the need for a min-max theorem. Recall
that Uhlmann’s Theorem for quantum states asserts that the fidelity F(ρ, ξ) between any two
quantum states ρ and ξ, acting on X , is given by
F(ρ, ξ) = max
U
|〈φ|(U ⊗ IX )|ψ〉| (19)
where |φ〉, |ψ〉 ∈ X ⊗ Y are any purifications of ρ, ξ and the maximization is over all unitaries
U acting on Y alone.
Intuitively, Fr(S, T ) should quantify the extent to which any purifications S˜, T˜ of two strate-
gies S, T can be made to look the same by acting only on the final memory space Zr. It follows
immediately from the definition of the strategy fidelity and Uhlmann’s Theorem that
Fr(S, T ) = min
B
F(ρS(B˜), ρT (B˜)) = min
B
max
U
∣∣∣〈ψ(S˜, B˜)| (U ⊗ IWr) |ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉∣∣∣ (20)
where, again, the maximization is over all unitaries U acting on Zr alone.
Notice the order of minimization and maximization in (20). This could be viewed as a
competitive game between Alice (who plays according to S or T ) and Bob (who plays according
to any arbitrary co-strategy B) in which Bob is trying to distinguish S from T and Alice is
trying to make S and T look the same. To these ends, Bob chooses his strategy B so as to
minimize the overlap |〈ψ(S˜, B˜)|ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉|; given such a choice B for Bob, Alice’s responds with
a unitary U that maximizes this overlap.
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The problem is that Alice’s choice of U may depend upon Bob’s co-strategy B. The task of
distinguishing S from T should depend only upon S and T—Alice should not be granted the
ability to tweak S or T after she has acquired knowledge of Bob’s specific choice of distinguishing
co-strategy B. From an operational perspective, it would be much more desirable if the order
of minimization and maximization in (20) were reversed. Alice should select her unitary U so
as to make S look as much as possible like T before Bob selects his distinguishing co-strategy
B. Thus, we require a type of min-max theorem.
The set of all co-strategies B for Bob is compact and convex [GW07], but it is not at all
clear that the objective function in (20) is convex in B; we show later (Lemma 16) that this is
indeed the case. However, the set of all unitaries U for Alice is not a convex set. One might
think that we could extend the domain of maximization to the convex hull of the unitaries in the
hopes that there is a saddle point (U,B) with U unitary. Unfortunately, saddle points do not
in general occur at extreme points of the domain, so we are not guaranteed that such a unitary
saddle point exists. Thus, a min-max theorem for the strategy fidelity involving unitaries is not
so easily forthcoming.
However, if we allow Alice to apply a general quantum channel, we are able to obtain a
min-max result, as stated below.
Theorem 10 (Strategy generalization of Uhlmann’s Theorem). Let S, T be r-round strategies
and let S˜, T˜ be any purifications of S, T . Let |ψ(S˜, B˜)〉, |ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉 be as defined in Definition 1.
We have
Fr(S, T )2 = maxΞ minB 〈ψ(S˜, B˜)|
[(
Ξ⊗ IL(Wr)
) (
|ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉〈ψ(T˜ , B˜)|
)]
|ψ(S˜, B˜)〉 (21)
where the minimum is over all r-round pure co-strategies B˜ and the maximum is over all
quantum channels Ξ acting on Zr alone.
Note that similar min-max results are derived in [BDR05] and [CDP+13]. It will be conve-
nient to define the following quantum channel.
Definition 11. A strategy fidelity-achieving channel Ξ is a channel which attains the maximum
in (21), above.
Semidefinite programming formulation of strategy fidelity
It was shown in [Gut12] that the strategy norm has a semidefinite programming formulation.
Also, the fidelity of quantum states has semidefinite programming formulations, see [Wat09,
Wat13] for examples. It is natural to ask whether the strategy fidelity has such a formulation.
We answer this question in the affirmative, below.
Theorem 12 (Semidefinite programming formulation of strategy fidelity). Fix any purifications
S˜ and T˜ of r-round strategies S and T , respectively. Then Fr(S, T )2 is equal to the optimal
objective function value of the following semidefinite program:
Fr(S, T )2 = max t
subject to tIX1  TrY1(R1)
Rj ⊗ IXj+1  TrYj+1(Rj+1), for j ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1},
Rr  12 TrZr
(
(K ⊗ IY1...r⊗X1...r) |T˜ 〉〉〈〈S˜|
)
+ h.c.[
IZr K
K∗ IZr
]
 0
(22)
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where the variables Rj are Hermitian matrices acting on Y1...j ⊗ X1...j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , r},
and h.c. denotes the Hermitian conjugate. Note that the optimization is over the Hermitian
matrices R1, . . . , Rr, the scalar t, and a (not neccessarily Hermitian) matrix K. (The last
constraint requires K to be in the convex hull of the set of unitaries acting on space Zr.)
There are a few reasons why it is beneficial to have a semidefinite programming formulation
of the strategy fidelity (or any other function for that matter). One is that efficient algorithms
that approximate semidefinite programs allow for the calculation of numerical values for specific
instances (assuming the problem instance is not too large for the computational platform).
Another reason is that semidefinite programming has a rich duality theory, which allows one
to certify bounds (upper bounds in this case) on the value of the strategy fidelity. Otherwise,
such a task would be very hard using the definition alone.
1.3 Applications to two-party quantum cryptography
Since the seminal work of Wiesner [Wie83] and Bennett and Brassard [BB84], there has been
much interest in knowing the advantages, and limitations, of quantum protocols for crypto-
graphic tasks. Due to the interactive setting of such protocols, the use of quantum strategy
analysis has proven to be useful. In [GW07], it was shown how to rederive Kitaev’s lower
bound for coin-flipping [Kit02]. In [CDP+13], it was shown how to find a simple proof of the
impossibility of interactive bit-commitment. Here, we find a similar proof of this and extend
the argument to oblivious string transfer.
In this paper, we present our ideas using the machinery we have developed for the strategy
fidelity. In particular, we show that the strategy version of the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities
(Eqn. (10)) are of central importance in providing security lower bounds. In fact, due to the
nature of the strategy norm and strategy fidelity, we are able to bound the security without even
specifying the entire protocol! To the best of our knowledge, this very general setting has only
been studied in a few security proofs (in particular, of bit-commitment) [BDR05, DKSW07,
CDP+13] and is in stark contrast to many other security proofs, for example in [Kit02, SR01,
Amb01, NS03, ABDR04, KN04, GW07, CK09, CK11, CKS13, CKS14, NST15, NST16, CGS16,
Sik17] where Alice and Bob’s actions are assumed to be fully specified (and known to cheating
parties).
In this paper, we show the impossibility of ideal quantum protocols for interactive bit-
commitment and oblivious string transfer.
Interactive bit-commitment
In bit-commitment, we require Alice and Bob to interact over two communication stages:
• Commit Phase: Alice chooses a uniformly random bit a and interacts with Bob using an
r-round pure strategy A˜a.
• Reveal Phase: Alice sends a to Bob and continues her interaction4 with him (so that Bob
can test if she has cheated).
• Cheat Detection: Bob, knowing which pure strategy B˜ he has used, measures to check if
the final state is consistent with Alice’s pure strategy A˜a. He aborts the protocol if this
measurement detects the final state is not consistent with Alice’s pure strategy A˜a. If
Alice is honest, he never aborts.
4Note that the interaction of the Reveal Phase is not part of the strategy A˜a. In fact, our results do not
depend on the structure of the Reveal Phase, other than revealing a.
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Protocols are designed with the intention to achieve the following two important properties of
interest:
• Binding: Alice cannot change her mind after the Commit Phase and reveal the other value
of a (without being detected by Bob).
• Concealing: Bob cannot learn Alice’s bit a before she reveals it during the Reveal Phase.
The references [May97, LC97, LC98] showed that when Alice and Bob’s actions are known
to both parties, bit-commitment with perfect binding and concealing is impossible. In the more
general setting when the actions need not be fully specified beforehand, bit-commitment was
shown to be impossible in [BDR05] for the channel setting, and in [DKSW07, CDP+13] for the
interactive setting. Here, we give another proof of this fact which follows straightforwardly from
the properties of the strategy fidelity and strategy norm which we have already discussed.
We define the cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob as follows:
BBC: The maximum probability with which a dishonest Bob can cheat by learning an honest
Alice’s committed bit a ∈ {0, 1} after the Commit Phase.
ABC: The maximum probability with which a dishonest Alice can cheat by changing her
commitment from 0 to 1 (or from 1 to 0) after the Commit Phase such that Bob
accepts the new value (i.e., he does not abort).
Remark 13. Note that in the definition of cheating Alice above, we do not assume Alice knows
Bob’s actions. It could even be the case that Bob’s sole purpose is to choose a co-strategy such
as to minimize ABC.
Cheating Bob wishes to distinguish between one of two uniformly randomly chosen strategies.
We know from [Gut12] that
BBC =
1
2 +
1
4‖A
0 −A1‖r. (23)
In Section 5, we show that
ABC ≥ Fr(A0, A1)2. (24)
An interesting observation is that this only depends on Alice’s honest strategies, not Bob’s.
Thus, by the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities for strategies (Proposition 5), we have the
following trade-off lower bound.
Theorem 14. In any interactive quantum protocol for bit-commitment, we have that√
ABC + 2BBC ≥ 2 (25)
implying
max{ABC,BBC} ≥ 9−
√
17
8 ≈ 61% (26)
(recall the definitions of ABC and BBC above Remark 13). In other words, at least one of Alice
or Bob can successfully cheat with probability at least 61% making bit-commitment insecure.
Note that this is a similar bound to the one obtained in [CDP+13] for the interactive setting
and exactly the same as in [BDR05] in the channel setting.
We remark that, in the scenario when Alice and Bob’s actions are completely specified,
optimal protocols are known [CK11] (albeit with a slightly different definition of cheating Alice).
We leave it as an open problem to determine if the bound we present above is optimal in the
scenario when Bob’s actions are not specified. Moreover, it would be interesting to see whether
the two scenarios share the same optimal cheating probabilities.
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1-out-of-2 interactive oblivious string transfer
This is an interactive cryptographic task between Alice and Bob where Bob has two bit-
strings5 (x0, x1) and Alice wishes to learn one of the two in the following manner:
• Alice chooses a uniformly random bit a which corresponds to her choice of which string
she wishes to learn, and interacts with Bob via the r-round pure strategy A˜a.
• For every (x0, x1), Bob uses a pure co-strategy B˜x0,x1 , such that Alice learns the string
xa with certainty by measuring her private space Zr at the end of the protocol.
Note that we do not assume any structure on how Bob behaves other than the consistency
condition above. For example, x0 and x1 may be the result of another protocol of which Alice is
not part, and thus she does not even know the distribution from which they are drawn. Again,
Bob’s strategy may be such that, conditioned on the above requirements, he just wants to foil
Alice’s cheating, as defined below.
We define the cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob as follows:
BOT: The maximum probability with which a dishonest Bob can cheat by correctly learning
an honest Alice’s choice bit a.
AOT: The maximum probability with which a dishonest Alice can cheat by correctly learning
x0 after learning x1 with certainty, or vice versa.
Cheating Bob behaves the exact same as in a bit-commitment protocol. Thus his cheating
probability is again
BOT =
1
2 +
1
4‖A
0 −A1‖r. (27)
In Section 5, we show the following bound on cheating Alice:
AOT ≥ Fr(A0, A1)2. (28)
This yields the same bound as in bit-commitment, below.
Theorem 15. In any interactive quantum protocol for 1-out-of-2 oblivious string transfer, we
have that √
AOT + 2BOT ≥ 2 (29)
implying
max{AOT,BOT} ≥ 9−
√
17
8 ≈ 61% (30)
(recall the definitions of AOT and BOT above). In other words, at least one of Alice or Bob can
successfully cheat with probability at least 61%, making oblivious string transfer insecure.
Note that in the case where Bob has two bits (i.e., the strings have bit-length 1), an optimal
security trade-off between Alice and Bob is known [CGS16]:
AOT + 2BOT ≥ 2. (31)
However, this assumes perfect knowledge of Alice and Bob’s honest strategies. Thus, our bound
for cheating Alice is a bit weaker, but has the added benefit of only depending on her honest
strategies.
5The bit-length of the strings are, surprisingly, not important for the purposes of this paper.
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1.4 Paper organization
We start with presenting some technical lemmas involving the strategy fidelity and generalizing
Uhlmann’s Theorem in Section 2. In Section 3, we prove the monotonicity of the strategy fidelity
under the action of supermaps. We then use the technical lemmas to formulate the strategy
fidelity of two strategies as a semidefinite program in Section 4. We conclude the paper by
presenting our main application of the study of strategy fidelity which is to capture Alice’s
cheating probability in interactive bit-commitment and oblivious string transfer, discussed in
Section 5.
2 Technical lemmas and the strategy generalization of Uhlmann’s Theorem
In this section we prove two lemmas that allow us to establish nontrivial properties of the
strategy fidelity. These lemmas are used to prove the strategy generalization of Uhlmann’s
Theorem (Theorem 10) and to provide a semidefinite programming formulation of the strategy
fidelity (Theorem 12).
Before we proceed, let us introduce some notation. Let Yi...jXi′...j′ be short for Yi...j⊗Xi′...j′ .
Let L(X ), U(X ), Her(X ), Pos(X ), and Dens(X ) be, respectively, the set of all linear, unitary,
Hermitian, positive semidefinite, and density operators acting on X . Let K(X ) be the convex
hull of U(X ), namely, the set of all operators K ∈ L(X ) such that ‖K‖ ≤ 1. Suppose X and Y
are two complex Euclidean spaces with fixed standard basis. Given a linear operator A : X → Y
written in the standard basis as
A =
dim(X )∑
i=1
dim(Y)∑
j=1
aj,i|j〉〈i|, (32)
the vectorization of A is
|A〉〉 :=
dim(X )∑
i=1
dim(Y)∑
j=1
aj,i|j〉 ⊗ |i〉 ∈ Y ⊗ X (33)
and its adjoint is 〈〈A| := (|A〉〉)∗.
Lemma 16 (Inner product is linear in B). Let S, T be r-round strategies and let S˜, T˜ be any
purifications of S, T . Let B be a compatible r-round co-strategy and let B˜ be any purification of
B. Let |ψ(S˜, B˜)〉, |ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉 be as in Definition 1 and let K ∈ L(Zr). It holds that
〈ψ(S˜, B˜)| (K ⊗ IWr) |ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉 = 〈〈S˜| (K ⊗B) |T˜ 〉〉. (34)
Note that the inner product above depends on B but not on its purification B˜. This
exemplifies what we stated earlier as Remark 2.
Proof of Lemma 16. The proof mirrors that of Ref. [GW07, Theorem 5]. The main difference
is that here we compute an inner product between two distinct vectors
|ψ(S˜, B˜)〉 and (K ⊗ IWr)|ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉 (35)
(both being normalized if K is unitary) arising from the distinct pure strategies S˜, T˜ for Alice,
whereas the proof of Ref. [GW07, Theorem 5] computes a similar inner product between two
identical, subnormalized vectors. Further clarification of that proof is given in Ref. [Gut09]; we
draw upon both of the references [GW07, Gut09] for the present proof.
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It was proved in [GW07] that
|ψ(S˜, B˜)〉 = (〈〈IY1...rX1...r | ⊗ IZrWr)
(
|S˜〉〉 ⊗ |B˜〉〉
)
, (36)
|ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉 = (〈〈IY1...rX1...r | ⊗ IZrWr)
(
|T˜ 〉〉 ⊗ |B˜〉〉
)
, (37)
from which we obtain
〈ψ(S˜, B˜)| (K ⊗ IWr) |ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉
=
(
〈〈S˜| ⊗ 〈〈B˜|
)
(|IY1...rX1...r〉〉〈〈IY1...rX1...r | ⊗K ⊗ IWr)
(
|T˜ 〉〉 ⊗ |B˜〉〉
)
. (38)
Let
K =
dim(Zr)∑
i,i′=1
ki,i′ |i〉〈i′| (39)
and, for each i = 1, . . . ,dim(Zr) and j = 1, . . . ,dim(Wr), let
S˜i, T˜i : X1...r → Y1...r (40)
B˜j : Y1...r → X1...r (41)
be the operators satisfying
S˜ =
dim(Zr)∑
i=1
S˜i ⊗ |i〉, T˜ =
dim(Zr)∑
i=1
T˜i ⊗ |i〉, B˜ =
dim(Wr)∑
j=1
B˜j ⊗ |j〉 (42)
so that (38) becomes
dim(Zr)∑
i,i′=1
dim(Wr)∑
j=1
ki,i′
(
〈〈S˜i| ⊗ 〈〈B˜j |
)
|IY1...rX1...r〉〉〈〈IY1...rX1...r |
(
|T˜i′〉〉 ⊗ |B˜j〉〉
)
. (43)
Using an identity from Ref. [Gut09, Proposition 3.5] we have that (43) becomes
dim(Zr)∑
i,i′=1
dim(Wr)∑
j=1
ki,i′〈〈S˜i|B˜∗j 〉〉 · 〈〈B˜∗j |T˜i′〉〉 =
dim(Zr)∑
i,i′=1
ki,i′〈〈S˜i|B|T˜i′〉〉 = 〈〈S˜| (K ⊗B) |T˜ 〉〉 (44)
given that Bob’s co-strategy equals B = ∑j |B˜∗j 〉〉〈〈B˜∗j | as observed in Ref. [Gut09, Theorem
3.1].
Lemma 17. Let S, T be r-round strategies and let S˜, T˜ be any purifications of S, T . It holds
that
Fr(S, T ) = max
K
min
B
<
(
〈〈S˜| (K ⊗B) |T˜ 〉〉
)
(45)
where the minimum is over all compatible r-round co-strategies B for Bob and the maximum is
over all K ∈ K(Zr) acting on the final memory space Zr for Alice.
Proof. By applying Lemma 16 to Eqn. (20), we get
Fr(S, T ) = min
B
max
U
∣∣∣〈〈S˜| (U ⊗B) |T˜ 〉〉∣∣∣ = min
B
max
U
<
(
〈〈S˜| (U ⊗B) |T˜ 〉〉
)
, (46)
where the maximum is over all U ∈ U(Zr). The advantage of this identity is that the objective
function is linear in U . Since linear functions are also convex and since the maximum of a
12
convex function over a compact convex set is always achieved at an extreme point, the above
quantity does not change if we replace the maximization over unitaries with the maximization
over the convex hull of the unitaries. Namely,
Fr(S, T ) = min
B
max
K
<
(
〈〈S˜| (K ⊗B) |T˜ 〉〉
)
, (47)
where the maximization is over all K ∈ K(Zr). By a standard min-max theorem from convex
analysis (see, for example, [Roc70]), we may reverse the order of optimization, concluding the
proof.
Now, with Lemmas 16 and 17 at our disposal, we proceed to prove the strategy generalization
of Uhlmann’s Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 10. From Lemma 17, it follows that
Fr(S, T ) ≤ max
K
min
B
∣∣∣〈〈S˜| (K ⊗B) |T˜ 〉〉∣∣∣ . (48)
We square this inequality and apply Lemma 16 to obtain
Fr(S, T )2 ≤ max
K
min
B
〈ψ(S˜, B˜)| (K ⊗ IWr) |ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉〈ψ(T˜ , B˜)| (K∗ ⊗ IWr) |ψ(S˜, B˜)〉. (49)
Let us define K¯ =
√
IZr −K∗K (noting that K∗K  IZr) and
ΞK : L(Zr)→ L(Zr) : X 7→ KXK∗ + K¯XK¯∗, (50)
which is a quantum channel as its Kraus representation {K, K¯} satisfies K∗K + K¯∗K¯ = IZr .
Since
〈ψ(S˜, B˜)|
(
K¯ ⊗ IWr
)
|ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉〈ψ(T˜ , B˜)|
(
K¯∗ ⊗ IWr
)
|ψ(S˜, B˜)〉 ≥ 0 (51)
for all K and all B˜, we have
Fr(S, T )2 ≤ max
K
min
B
〈ψ(S˜, B˜)|
[(
ΞK ⊗ IL(Wr)
) (
|ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉〈ψ(T˜ , B˜)|
)]
|ψ(S˜, B˜)〉 (52)
≤ max
Ξ
min
B
〈ψ(S˜, B˜)|
[(
Ξ⊗ IL(Wr)
) (
|ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉〈ψ(T˜ , B˜)|
)]
|ψ(S˜, B˜)〉. (53)
However, we clearly have
Fr(S, T )2 = min
B
max
Ξ
〈ψ(S˜, B˜)|
[(
Ξ⊗ IL(Wr)
) (
|ψ(T˜ , B˜)〉〈ψ(T˜ , B˜)|
)]
|ψ(S˜, B˜)〉 (54)
due to Eqn. (20) and the fact that Uhlmann’s Theorem also holds replacing unitaries with
channels. Hence, the inequality (53) is in fact an equality due to the max–min inequality.
3 Monotonicity
Recall that strategy supermaps Υ map r-round strategies to r′-round strategies and they are
linear and completely positive. For our results, we need certain properties of the adjoints of
strategy supermaps. To this end, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 18. If X ∈ Pos(Y1...rX1...r) satisfies 〈X,S〉 = 1 for all r-round strategies S having
input spaces X1, . . . ,Xr and output spaces Y1, . . . ,Yr, then X is an r-round co-strategy having
input spaces Y1, . . . ,Yr and output spaces X1, . . . ,Xr.
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Proof. If X  0 satisfies 〈X,S〉 = 1 for all strategies S, then X also satisfies 〈X,S′〉 ≤ 1 for all
S′ such that 0  S′  S for some strategy S. Thus, from Ref. [GW07]6, we have that there
exists a co-strategy B such that X  B. For any pair of compatible strategy S and co-strategy
B, we have 〈B,S〉 = 1 [GW07], therefore, we have 〈X,S〉 = 〈B,S〉 for all strategies S. Next, if
we consider
S = 1dim(Y1...r)IY1...rX1...r , (55)
where dim(Y1...r) is the product of the dimensions of spaces Y1, . . . ,Yr, then this is a valid
strategy. Then we get that X and B have the same trace. Since 0  X  B, we have that
X = B, which completes the proof.
We can now provide an important property of the adjoint of strategy supermaps.
Lemma 19. If Υ is a strategy supermap from r-round strategies to r′-round strategies, then Υ∗
is a co-strategy supermap7 from r′-round co-strategies to r-round co-strategies.
Proof. Let B be an r′-round co-strategy. Then have have that
〈Υ∗(B), S〉 = 〈B,Υ(S)〉 = 1 (56)
for all r-round strategies S. Since Υ is completely positive, so is Υ∗, implying that Υ∗(B)
is positive semidefinite. From Lemma 18, we have that Υ∗(B) is an r-round co-strategy, as
required.
3.1 Monotonicity of the strategy fidelity
We now provide a proof of Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7. Since Υ is completely positive, we can let
Υ : S 7→ TrM(MSM∗) (57)
Υ∗ : S′ 7→M∗(IM ⊗ S′)M (58)
be Stinespring representations of Υ and its adjoint Υ∗, respectively, where the operator M has
the form
M : Y1...rX1...r → Y ′1...r′X ′1...r′M (59)
for some appropriately large space M. Let
S˜, T˜ : X1...r → Y1...rZr (60)
be purifications of the r-round strategies S, T for some appropriately large final memory space
Zr, and let |S˜〉〉, |T˜ 〉〉 be their respective vectorizations. Given the standard basis {|i〉 : i ∈
{1, . . . ,dim(X1...r)}} of X1...r, we have
S =
∑
i,j
TrZr
(
S˜|i〉〈j|S˜∗
)
⊗ |i〉〈j| = TrZr
((∑
i
S˜|i〉 ⊗ |i〉
)(∑
j
〈j|S˜∗ ⊗ 〈j|
))
= TrZr
(
|S˜〉〉〈〈S˜|
)
.
(61)
Hence
Υ(S) = TrM (MSM∗) = TrZrM
(
(M ⊗ IZr)|S˜〉〉〈〈S˜|(M∗ ⊗ IZr)
)
, (62)
6In the terminology of [GW07], we have that X ∈ (↓ Sr(X1...r,Y1...r))◦.
7Here, we define co-strategy supermaps in the analogous way as strategy supermaps.
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and an analogous equality holds for T and T˜ . Thus one can observe that the vectors
(M ⊗ IZr)|S˜〉〉, (M ⊗ IZr)|T˜ 〉〉 ∈ Y1...rX1...rZrM (63)
are the vectorizations of purifications of the r′-round strategies Υ(S),Υ(T ) with final memory
space ZrM.
By Eqn. (20) and Lemma 16 we have
Fr′(Υ(S),Υ(T )) = min
B′
max
U ′
∣∣∣〈〈S˜|(M∗ ⊗ IZr) (U ′ ⊗B′) (M ⊗ IZr)|T˜ 〉〉∣∣∣ (64)
where the minimum is over all r′-round co-strategies B′ for Bob and the maximum is over all
unitaries U ′ ∈ U(ZrM) on the final memory space ZrM for Alice. The quantity (64) can only
decrease if we restrict the domain of maximization to unitaries of the form U ⊗ IM for some
U ∈ U(Zr), thus
Fr′(Υ(S),Υ(T )) ≥ min
B′
max
U
∣∣∣〈〈S˜|(M∗ ⊗ IZr) (U ⊗ IM ⊗B′) (M ⊗ IZr)|T˜ 〉〉∣∣∣ (65)
= min
B′
max
U
∣∣∣〈〈S˜| (U ⊗M∗(IM ⊗B′)M) |T˜ 〉〉∣∣∣ (66)
= min
B′
max
U
∣∣∣〈〈S˜| (U ⊗Υ∗(B′)) |T˜ 〉〉∣∣∣ . (67)
As the image under Υ∗ of the set of all r′-round co-strategies is a subset of the set of all r-round
co-strategies (by Lemma 19), the quantity (67) can only decrease if we extend the domain of
minimization to all r-round co-strategies B for Bob:
Fr′(Υ(S),Υ(T )) ≥ min
B
max
U
∣∣∣〈〈S˜| (U ⊗B) |T˜ 〉〉∣∣∣ = Fr(S, T ) (68)
as desired.
3.2 Monotonicity of the strategy norm
Proof of Theorem 9. By the definition of the strategy norm, Definition 8, we have
‖Υ(H)‖r′ = max
{〈
B′0 −B′1,Υ(H)
〉
: B′0 +B′1 is an r′-round co-strategy, B′0, B′1  0
}
(69)
= max
{〈
Υ∗(B′0)−Υ∗(B′1), H
〉
: B′0 +B′1 is an r′-round co-strategy, B′0, B′1  0
}
(70)
≤ max {〈B0 −B1, H〉 : B0 +B1 is an r-round co-strategy, B0, B1  0} (71)
= ‖H‖r . (72)
Note that Υ∗ is both linear and completely positive. Thus, given B′0, B′1  0 such that B′0 +B′1
is an r′-round co-strategy, we have that B0 := Υ∗(B′0)  0 and B1 := Υ∗(B′1)  0 and, by
Lemma 19, B0 +B1 is an r-round co-strategy. But the image under Υ∗ of the set of all r′-round
co-strategies may be a strict subset of the set of all r-round co-strategies, hence the inequality
in the above expression.
4 Semidefinite programming formulation for strategy fidelity
In this section, we use Lemma 17 to prove Theorem 12. From Lemma 17, we have that
Fr(S, T )2 = max {φ(K) : K ∈ K(Zr)} (73)
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where φ(K) := min
B
< 〈〈S˜| (K ⊗B) |T˜ 〉〉, and B is Bob’s co-strategy. By defining
C := 12 TrZr
(
(K ⊗ IY1...rX1...r) |T˜ 〉〉〈〈S˜|
)
+ 12
[
TrZr
(
(K ⊗ IY1...rX1...r) |T˜ 〉〉〈〈S˜|
)]∗
(74)
we can write
φ(K) = min
B
〈C,B〉. (75)
From [GW07, Corollary 7], we know that B must satisfy B = Qr ⊗ IYr for some (Q1, . . . , Qr)
satisfying
Tr(Q1) = 1, TrXi(Qi) = Qi−1 ⊗ IYi−1 , for i ∈ {2, . . . , r} (76)
and Q1 ∈ Pos(X1), Qi ∈ Pos(Y1...i−1⊗X1...i), for i ∈ {2, . . . , r}. Thus, φ(K) can be formulated
as a semidefinite program. Its dual can be written as
α(K) := max
{
t : tIX1  TrY1(R1),
Rj ⊗ IXj+1  TrYj+1(Rj+1) for j ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, Rr  C
}
, (77)
where Rj ∈ Her(Y1...j ⊗ X1...j). Since this has a strictly feasible solution, as does the primal,
we know α(K) = φ(K) by strong duality and α(K) attains an optimal solution. We now let
M =
[
IZr K
K∗ IZr
]
and set M  0 to get ‖K‖ ≤ 1. We can check that C is a linear function
in M (since M is Hermitian). Thus, we have that the strategy fidelity can be written as in
Theorem 12.
5 Alice’s cheating in interactive bit-commitment and oblivious string transfer
In this section we show that Alice can cheat with probability Fr(A0, A1)2 in either bit-commitment
or oblivious string transfer. The cheating has the same flavour in both cases: Alice will follow
the protocol honestly, then try to change her state as to make it look like she chose the other
strategy from the beginning. Suppose Alice uses pure strategy A˜a and Bob uses pure co-strategy
B˜. For brevity, define for each a ∈ {0, 1} the following states
|ψa〉 := |ψ(A˜a, B˜)〉 and σa := (Ξa ⊗ IWr)(|ψa〉〈ψa|) (78)
where Ξa is the strategy fidelity-achieving channel (from Definition 11) such that
〈ψa¯|σa|ψa¯〉 ≥ Fr(A0, A1)2. (79)
Note that the aim of Ξa is to get σa as close as possible to |ψa¯〉〈ψa¯|.
5.1 Bit-commitment
When we study interactive bit-commitment, we are applying the strategy/co-strategy formalism
only to the Commit Phase. From the above discussion, Alice can create the state
σa ∈ Dens(Zr ⊗Wr) (80)
to try to change her commitment from a to a¯. Then Alice continues her actions to “reveal” a¯ in
the Reveal Phase, as does Bob (even though Bob’s actions are not specified to Alice). We just
assume that this entire process is done by a unitary Ua¯ acting on Zr ⊗Wr. Then, Bob has a
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projective measurement {Πaccept,Πreject} which accepts Ua¯|ψa¯〉 with certainty, thus leading to
a non-destructive measurement. Thus, we have
(IZr ⊗Πaccept)Ua¯|ψa¯〉 = Ua¯|ψa¯〉. (81)
This implies that
(IZr ⊗Πaccept)  Ua¯|ψa¯〉〈ψa¯|U∗a¯ . (82)
However, Alice’s actions have led to them sharing Ua¯σaU
∗¯
a at the end of the protocol. So, we
have that Alice successfully reveals a¯ with probability
ABC ≥ 〈IZr⊗Πaccept, Ua¯σaU∗a¯ 〉 ≥ 〈Ua¯|ψa¯〉〈ψa¯|U∗a¯ , Ua¯σaU∗a¯ 〉 = 〈|ψa¯〉〈ψa¯|, σa〉 ≥ Fr(A0, A1)2 (83)
using Eqn. (79), as desired.
5.2 Oblivious string transfer
We can assume Alice uses a projective measurement {Πaz} to learn her desired string. Note
that since xa is learned with certainty, this is a non-destructive measurement, as in the bit-
commitment analysis above. That is, we have(
Πaxa ⊗ IWr
) |ψ(A˜a, B˜x0,x1)〉 = |ψ(A˜a, B˜x0,x1)〉 (84)
for all a and (x0, x1). Again, this implies
Πaxa ⊗ IWr  |ψ(A˜a, B˜x0,x1)〉〈ψ(A˜a, B˜x0,x1)|. (85)
Thus, after learning xa, she can create the state σa (defined above) to try to learn xa¯. (Here,
the B˜ in the definition of σa is B˜
x0,x1 .) Then she measures as if she had used pure strategy A˜a¯
(that is, using {Πa¯z}) to try to learn xa¯. Then, using (85) and the definitions in (78), we have
AOT ≥ 〈Πa¯xa¯ ⊗ IWr , σa〉 ≥ 〈ψa¯|σa|ψa¯〉 ≥ Fr(A0, A1)2, (86)
as desired.
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